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MAY-JUNE, 1961
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND APPEALS
By WILLIAM H. ERICKSON*
The log jam of cases at issue in the Supreme Court was broken
by full use of the rights granted to the Supreme Court to hear and
determine cases in department under article VI, section 5, of the
Colorado Constitution. Three hundred sixty-nine written opinions
issued out of the Supreme Court in 1960, sixty-seven of which were
written by outside county or district judges who sat with the court
and wrote the opinions in accordance with the court's directions in
department. In hearing cases in department, three justices of the
Supreme Court always participated and oral argument was required
in all cases. Moreover, the right to hear a case in department is
limited to those cases where no constitutional right is involved un-
der either the Colorado Constitution or the Constitution of the
United States. Under the mandate of article VI, section 5 of the
Colorado Constitution, no decision could be a judgment of the Su-
preme Court unless concurred in by at least three judges of the
Supreme Court, and in many cases there was not unanimity of opin-
ion among the three justices, and an en banc session of the court
was required to voice the court's opinion.
In Horton v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank' the judgment was
affirmed by operation of law when the chief justice did not partici-
pate and three judges voted for affirmance and three for reversal
after the case was first heard in department. See Scott v. Shook2
on the issue of the right to additional oral argument after a hearing
in department.
A number of decisions construed the Rules of Civil Procedure
and those decisions are reviewed in this article in the numerical or-
der of the Rules. The author has endeavored to include in this arti-
cle all decisions of the court which set forth, alter, or clarify the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
RULE 12
A. Motion to Dismiss
The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a
complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted in a
number of cases.
The complaint for an accounting in McKinney v. Christmas:
was dismissed by the trial court as being insufficient, but was up-
held by the Supreme Court. The court held that in assessing a mo-
tion to dismiss the facts alleged are admitted and the sole question
is whether the complaint contains allegations affording sufficient
notice of the claim to advise the defendant of the relief sought.
In a tort action, Spomer v. City of Grand Junction,4 a claim was
made that the city, in the operation of a cemetery, had wrongfully
removed a body from a burial lot, and the trial court sustained a
*Member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associat'ons and of the Denver firm of Hindry, Erickson
and Meyer.
1 355 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1960).
280 Colo. 40, 249 Pac. 259 (1926). See also 47 A.L.R. 1108 (1927); Colo. R. Civ. P. 117.
3 353 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1960).
4 355 P.2d 960 (Colo. 1960).
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motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff's case. In reversing
the trial court, the court said:
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure the main purpose
of the complaint is to furnish notice to an adversary of the
transaction or occurrence complained of. If a party states
any claim and proves it by a preponderance of evidence, he
is entitled to relief. As was said in Bridges v. Ingram, 122
Colo. 501, 223 P. (2d) 1051, 1054:
'* * * If sufficient notice concerning the transaction in-
volved is afforded the adverse party, the theory of the
pleader is not important. If, under the facts, the substan-
tive law provided relief upon any theory, the cause should
proceed to judgment. * * *'
Rulings of this court under former practice and proce-
dure that pleadings are construed most strongly against the
pleader are not in harmony with present day procedure in
civil actions. The rule now is that pleadings are to be con-
strued in favor of the pleader. It necessarily follows that
issues joined upon matters which are immaterial to a claim
are surplusage and need not be proved. So in the case be-
fore us if any of the allegations of the amended complaint
gave notice to the defendants of a claim for relief and there
was some competent evidence produced at the trial upon
which relief could be granted, a dismissal of the action was
not in order.;
Cline v. Whitten6 came before the court after judgment was en-
tered on a motion to dismiss. The plaintiff had sought to have its
rights determined and to obtain protection against interference
with the storage of water coming from springs. The defendant's
motion set forth that the complaint failed to state a claim against
the defendant upon which relief could be granted, and that the re-
lief could only be obtained in a proceeding for the adjudication of
the rights of all parties in the water district in which the right was
claimed.
In reversing the trial court, the court said that the plaintiff's
complaint stated facts which if proven entitled plaintiff to the in-
junctive relief sought.
Malicious prosecution was the allegation of the plaintiff in
Lowen v. Hilton7 The plaintiff contended that a hold and treat or-
der entered out of the county court on the basis of a letter from
Doctor Hilton which was obtained through the plaintiff's brother.
Subsequently, the county court found that the plaintiff was not in-
sane, and the complaint was filed shortly thereafter. The defend-
ants all filed motions to dismiss, and the motions were sustained.
The defendants contended that the one-year statute of limitations
for false imprisonment barred the action." The two-year statute of
limitations protecting those in the healing arts was also looked to
as a bar by Doctor Hilton." Another statute pleaded as an affirma-
tive defense provides in part: "Such order of the court shall be a
complete protection for the confinement, examination, diagnosis,
5 Id. at 962-63.
6 355 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1960).
7 351 P.2d 881 (Cola. 1960).
t Colo. Rev. Stat. 87-1-2 (1953).
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 87-1-6 (1953).
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observation and treatment of such patient as against all persons."'10
The Supreme Court held that the affirmative defenses were not
well taken. The statute of limitations was held to be inapplicable,
and the court said:
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, all facts alleged
in the complaint must be assumed to be true. We are satis-
fied that it was not the intention of the legislature to leave
a person without a remedy of any kind who admittedly has
been subjected to the grievous wrongs here alleged to have
been committed by the defendants.
The purpose of the statute relied on for dismissal is to
protect those persons who, following the entry of the 'hold
and treat' order, have the responsibility pursuant to said
order 'for the confinement, examination, diagnosis, obser-
vation and treatment of such patient.'
A person who admittedly has been maliciously wronged
by persons who conspire to prosecute him as an insane per-
son without probable cause, cannot be deprived of a judi-
cial remedy for the wrong. Had the legislature intended
any such result, which we think it did not, the statute
would be of doubtful validity when subjected to the test
of Article II Section 6 of the Constitution of Colorado .... 11
In Knowlton v. Cervi,'2 the court held that a complaint in a li-
bel suit must state a claim upon which relief may be granted and
10 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 71-1-3 (3) (1953).
11 Lowen v. Hilton, supra note 7 at 883.
12 350 P.
2
d 1C66 (Colo. 1960).
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that a trial court may grant a motion to dismiss in a libel action as
well as in other suits, and affirmed the trial court's granting of the
motion to dismiss.
In Flank Oil Co. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission,13 a case brought
under the Colorado Unfair Practices Act,1" the plaintiff sought a
temporary and permanent injunction. The defendants moved to
dismiss, questioning the constitutionality of the Act, and the indef-
inite language of the statute. The motions to dismiss were sustained,
and the plaintiffs elected to stand upon the complaint as filed and
prayed that a final judgment of dismissal be entered. In reversing
the trial court, the Supreme Court held that the issue of the consti-
tutionality of the statute could be determined on a motion to dis-
miss, but upheld the statute and pointed out that the questions
raised were not constitutional in nature and that the problems urged
as grounds for upholding the judgment of dismissal were prema-
ture and must await the trial of the case.
In examining the powers of district judges sitting separately
in the same county, the Supreme Court in Denver Electric & Neon
Serv. Corp. v. Phipps, Inc.1 5 upheld the trial judge's dismissal of
various claims set out in the plaintiff's complaint which had been
previously held to be sufficient by a different trial judge in the
same county and said that the order denying the motion to dismiss
could be modified or changed under the limitations of Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 37-4-18 (1953).
In McPherson v. McPherson1" the court found that a claimant
against an estate had been denied his day in court by summary dis-
missal of his claim after the court had determined that the hearing
on the claim should be in accordance with the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. A motion to strike had been treated by the trial court as a
motion to dismiss and was argued as a defense of laches and the
statute of limitations. The court held that the statute of limitations
is not grounds for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted and pointed out that the statute of
limitations and laches must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer
under Rule 8(c) and could have only been properly determined
after a full hearing on the merits.
B. Judgment on the Pleadings
Flavell v. Dep't of Welfare T reversed an order granting judg-
ment on the pleadings. The action was one to recover the unpaid
balance on a promissory note and the execution of the note was ad-
mitted. Affirmative defenses were pleaded before the trial court
by way of answer, counterclaim, and reply. The court found that
the allegations in the pleadings raised issues of both fact and law
which must be presumed to be true for the purpose of considering
a motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case
for trial on the merits.
C. Bill of Particulars
In affirming the judgment of the trial court in Sheldon v.
Schmidt,' the court cast aside the argument that error had been
13 349 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1960).
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 55-2-1 (1955).
15 354 P.2d 618 (Colo. 1960).
16358 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1960).
17 355 P.2d 941 (Colo. 1960).





committed by the denial of a bill of particulars in a debt action and
said:
The granting or denying of a motion to make a plead-
ing more definite and certain lies within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court and its ruling on such a motion
will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of
an abuse of discretion and prejudice to the party affected.
The defendant here made no effort to avail himself of
the many procedural steps open to him under the rules
whereby he could have obtained the information he claimed
he needed in order to answer the complaint. When the
amended complaint was filed, he promptly answered and
again did nothing to obtain more definite information from
the plaintiff. The evidence at the trial shows that many
of the facts sought in his motion were known to the de-
fendant before the suit was filed.
We are persuaded that no prejudice resulted to de-
fendant by refusal of the court to grant his motion to make
more definite and certain; nor did the court abuse its dis-
cretion in denying the motion. 19
RULE 15
The right to amendment was declared to be sacrosanct in Ren-
ner v. Chilton.20 Claims had been made in the trial court which did
not withstand a motion to dismiss, and the trial judge refused to
allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint on his oral motion and
stated that the entire complaint seemed to be based on judicial or
semi-judicial proceedings which were privileged. The court af-
firmed the trial court's finding of privilege, but held that under
Rule 15 (a) a party is entitled to one amendment as a matter of
right when a responsive pleading has not been filed.
RULE 38
In an action to recover an attorney's fee, Jaynes v. Marrow
21
brough into play Rules 38 and 39. When the original complaint and
answer were filed neither party made demand for a jury trial. Near-
ly a year after the case was at issue and shortly before trial the de-
fendant filed a demand for a jury trial, and a jury trial was ordered
over the objection of the plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for
the defendant, and on writ of error it was argued that the defendant
had waived his right to a jury trial as a matter of law by his belated
request. In analyzing Rule 38 the court pointed out that a litigant
could secure a jury trial as a matter of right by complying with the
requirements of the rule, but held that the trial court, in its discre-
tion, under Rule 39, notwithstanding the failure of a party to de-
mand a jury trial, could order a trial by a jury on any or all issues.
The court refused to follow the federal rule, which imposes a severe
limitation on belated jury requests and limits the discretion of the
trial judge, and said: "Trial courts, either with a belated motion
before them, with or without reasons stated therein, or without any
motion at all, may order a jury trial, because it is within their dis-
cretion so to do."
22
19 Id. at 289-90.
20 351 P.2d 277.(Colo. 1960).
21 355 P.2d 529 cc:,;. .
22 Id. t AM
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A declaratory judgment action furnished the background for
Baumgartner v. Schey2 3 and an interpretation of Rule 38 in connec-
tion with Rule 57. The question before the court in the declaratory
judgment action was whether the actions and conduct of the parties
had extended a written lease for farm land for an additional year.
The trial court granted trial to a jury but reserved its judgment on
the question of whether the defendants were entitled to a jury trial
in view of a claim made by the plaintiff for an accounting in con-
nection with the declaratory relief sought. The jury returned a
verdict for the defendants which the trial court set aside. In re-
versing the trial court, the court held that the right to a jury trial
is to be determined by whether the right existed prior to the pas-
sage of the Declaratory Judgment Act in the particular type of ac-
tion before the court, and held that all of the pleadings, as well as
all issues and evidence, must be examined to determine whether
the issues were legal or equitable, and that joinder of legal and
equitable remedies would not deprive a party of the right to jury
trial on legal issues.
It was urged in McGregor v. Porter24 that a request for a jury
trial, made at the pretrial conference, which was not ruled upon,
constituted grounds for reversal after trial was completed to the
court, without objection. The court found that trial to a jury had
been waived.
23 3 3 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1960).
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Droghei v. Meehan25 involved the interpretation of Rule 42 after
two damage actions had been consolidated for trial. The facts were
the same in both actions, the witnesses were identical, and they
were competent to testify in each suit. The court found that there
was no abuse of discretion by the trial court consolidating the two
actions for trial.
RULE 43 (b)
The question before the court in Van Hise v. Trino2 6 was wheth-
er the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying counsel
for the defendant the right to cross-examine the defendant upon
the subject matter of the examination in chief after the defendant
was called as an adverse witness for cross-examination under Rule
43(b). The court acknowledged the defendant's contention that
Rule 43 (b) grants the right of cross-examination at the time a par-
ty is called as an adverse witness for cross-examination but found
no prejudice by reason of the fact that the defendant took the stand
on her own behalf and presented her testimony fully to the court.
RULE 44
Rule 44(a) was the key issue in Superior Distrib. Corp. v. Har-
grove27 when the plaintiff sought to enforce an Oklahoma judgment.
The record before the trial court consisted of certified copies of var-
ious instruments from the court of common pleas of Oklahoma and
formed the basis of the trial court's judgment. In reversing the low-
er court and remanding the case for new trial, the court said:
Were these certified copies such as to comply with
R.C.P. 44(a)?
The question is answered in the negative.
The rule provides:
'An official record or an entry therein, when admissi-
ble for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official pub-
lication thereof, or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record or his deputy, and accom-
panied with a certificate that such officer has the custody.
If the office in which the record is kept is within the Unit-
ed States or within a territory or possession subject to the
dominion of the United States, the certificate may be made
by a judge of a court of record of the district or political
subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by
the seal of the court, or may be made by any public officer
having a seal of office and having official duties in the dis-
trict or political subdivision in which the record is kept,
authenticated by the seal of his office. * * *.I
There is a difference between a certified copy of a rec-
ord and one made according to the rule. The rule is plain
and is in full force and effect. It was not followed.
The court erred in the first instance in admitting these
documents into evidence. Had it ruled properly thereon,
plaintiffs might have been able to prove the judgment
through other methods as provided in R.C.P. 44 (c):
25 353 P.2d 98 (Colo. 1960).
26 352 P.2d 284 (Colo. 1960).
27 355 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1960).
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'This rule does not prevent the proof of official records
or of entry or lack of entry therein by any method author-
ized by any applicable statute or by the rules of evidence
at common law.'
28
The procedure to be followed in enforcing foreign judgments
was made crystal clear by the court in a series of decisions.
In Ginsberg v. Gifford29 the plaintiff was the assignee of a
California superior court judgment. The record before the trial
court included a verified complaint, a summons, an affidavit of
service, an affidavit re military service, a written application for
entry of the default, an entry of default, and a certificate of the
clerk declaring that the judgment had been entered and that no ap-
peal had been taken or any order entered modifying or vacating
the judgment. The plaintiff also offered by way of evidence the
California Interest Statute and the California Constitution showing
jurisdiction in the superior court. The trial court held that the
complaint was insufficient and contained no averment that the for-
eign judgment was valid, final, and enforceable under the laws of
the State of California and that the element of present enforcea-
bility was totally lacking in the complaint. It dismissed the com-
plaint pursuant to the defendant's motion. The complaint provided
that a judgment had been entered and stated the amount due and
owing. The Supreme Court held that a prima facie case was shown
and that the trial court had erred in dismissing the complaint.
In Superior Distrib. Corp. v. Zarelli30 the sole issue was whether
the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant's motion to
dismiss after the plaintiff had rested his case and the defendant
elected to stand on its motion. The suit was to recover a judgment
which was entered in favor of the plaintiff in the superior court of
Washington. The defendant contended that the complaint was de-
fective because it failed to allege that the Washington judgment
was a valid and final judgment capable of being enforced in that
state and relied on Gobin v. Citizens' State Bank.31 The defendant's
contentions, however, were cast aside when the court ruled:
These allegations in substance allege that the judg-
ment was a valid and final adjudication remaining in full
force in the state of its rendition and capable of being there
enforced by final process. Under our liberalized rules of
civil procedure it is the substance of the complaint rather
than the form that is paramount. We thus hold plaintiff
in error's contention that the failure to include the allega-
tion in the exact words stated in the Gobin case constitutes
reversible error to be without merit .... ".2
In Blackmon v. Klein33 the court again had occasion to examine
the procedure for the enforcement of a foreign judgment. A Wyo-
ming judgment was the subject of the suit and the defense inter-
posed in the trial court was the statute of limitations. In-affirming
the lower court, Colo. Rev. Stat. §87-1-22 and 87-1-30 were inter-
preted and the court found that the statute of limitations did not
2 Id. at 313.
29 355 P.2d 657 (Colo. 1960).
30 352 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1960).
31 92 Colo. 350, 20 P.2d 1007 (1933).
32 Superior Distributing Corp. v. Zarelli, 352 P.2d 967, 968 (Colo. 1960).
3 357 P.2d 91 (Colo. 1960).
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bar the action under the statutes cited by reason of the fact that the
defendant had absented himself from the State of Colorado and had
tolled the statute of limitations.
However, in Superior Distrib. Corp. v. McCror 34 the court re-
versed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on a Florida judgment,
finding that the judgment was conditional by nature and stated:
We consider the circumstances allegedly furnishing a
ground for reversible error. At the conclusion of McCrory's
evidence Superior moved for dismissal, submitting that the
Florida judgment was 'totally interlocutory'; that until the
conditions imposed upon McCrory had 'been done, this
(was) not in fact a final judgment and (McCrory was)
not entitled to recover because the Court specifically states
that he shall be entitled to a final judgment upon doing so.'
It is claimed that denial of this motion was error.
The resolution of this point makes unnecessary the
consideration of other questions presented. Decided cases
point to an impediment in the maintenance of the suit on
the Florida judgment, i.e., a contingent, inconclusive ad-
judication, interlocutory in nature.
While the judgment of one state is entitled to receive
the same faith and credit given it in the state where en-
tered, yet it is necessary 'that, in order to maintain an ac-
tion in one state upon a money judgment recovered in an-
other state, such judgment must be a final adjudication, in
full force in the state where rendered and capable of being
enforced by final process, and ordinarily it should create
a definite and absolute indebtedness against the judgment
debtor.'...35
RULE 54 (b)
In construing Rule 54 (b) and the final judgment requirements
of Rule 111 (a) the Supreme Court found that there was no final
judgment and dismissed a writ of error in Fidelity & Deposit v.
May.36 The case involved multiple claims and multiple defendants.
One defendant obtained a summary judgment in the trial court and
34 356 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1960).
35 Id. at 962.






the plaintiff caused a writ of error to issue. The plaintiff contended
in the Supreme Court that there was no final judgment and filed
a motion which was sustained. The court said in interpreting Rule
54(b):
Construction of this rule and its application to the en-
try of a summary judgment in favor of less than all the par-
ties in a multiple claim situation was had in the case of
Broadway Roofing and Supply, Inc. v. District Court, 140
Colo. [154], 342 P. (2d) 1022. Our disposition of that case
furnishes a guide and precedent for the instant case. In
that case we held that, in order to effect a final judgment or
final disposition of the case, thus rendering it reviewable
by this court, the trial court should have (1) expressly de-
termined that there was no just reason for delay, and (2)
expressly directed the entry of a judgment.
There is finality in what the trial court did in the in-
stant case, but finality under the rule contemplates more
than the rendition of a judgment. A rule has been estab-
lished which, in definitive language, directs what must be
done where multiple claims are involved and less than all
of them decided.
3 7
The publicized knitting machine cases found their way to the
court in Berry v. West Knit Originals, Inc.," when eighty-one plain-
tiffs claimed they were induced to purchase knitting machines by
fraudulent representations. All the defendants did not appear be-
fore the Supreme Court. The case was viewed by the Supreme
Court after the trial judge granted a motion to dismiss as to two
defendants. In interpreting Rule 54 (b) and Rule 111 (a) and the
requirement that there be a final judgment before a writ of error
could issue, the court held that a judgment or decree is not final
which determines the action as to less than all of the defendants
unless the requirements of Rule 54 (b) are met.
RULE 55
In Radinsky v. Kripke39 the sole question was whether the trial
court abused its discretion in dismissing an action with prejudice for
failure to prosecute. Dissolution of a law partnership formed the
background of the action. The trial court appointed a referee to
conduct an accounting and the hearings were delayed over a long
period of time. Dismissal took place under Rule 18 of the district
court, which provides:
Dismissal of Actions-Failure to Prosecute, etc. Pay-
ment of Costs
Sec. 1. The Clerk of this Court, at the opening of the
September Term of each year, shall report to the Judges
such cases as may be pending in their respective Civil Di-
visions, in which no order or progress has been made and
entered of record for a period of twelve (12) months. All
such cases shall be dismissed with prejudice thirty days
after service of written notice by the Clerk to attorneys of
record or parties, at their last known addresses, unless good
37 Id. at 343-44.
38 357 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1960).
39 354 P.2d 500 (Colo. 1960).
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cause shall be shown why the same should not be dis-
missed.
40
The trial court found that the plaintiff was under a duty to go for-
ward and did not show diligence. In reversing the judgment of dis-
missal and directing that a new referee be appointed to carry out
the accounting, the court said:
It has been held in Colorado that a delay occasioned
by the failure of an officer of the court (the Clerk) in cir-
cumstances where the plaintiff has not failed to comply
with any legal requirements, is not grounds for dismissal
for failure to prosecute. [citations] . . . This rule extends
to delays occasioned by all officers of the court, including
masters and referees.
An additional reason also exists requiring reversal
here.
If the Findings and Judgment of the trial court were
meant to be a default judgment, then we find no compli-
ance with our Rules of Civil Procedure which provide how
judgments by default must be entered after proper motion
therefor with notice (Rule 55). And if this be considered
an involuntary dismissal it failed to comply with Rule 41
R.C.P. Colo., which also requires a motion; and then notice
thereof must be given as required by Rule 5 ....
Also, it is obvious that the trial court failed to follow
its own Rule XVIII, which did not apply. This is so because
no written notice was given as required therein and if it
had been given then this record discloses 'good cause' why
the action should not have been dismissed.41
RULE 56
The Supreme Court did not extend its interpretation of Rule
56 in 1960, although it did sustain two summary judgments. The
law on summary judgments was reannounced by the court in the
case of Credit Inv. & Loan Co. v. Guar. Bank & Trust Co.42 The
plaintiff in his complaint charged breach of contract and malicious
interference with contract. The defendant interposed a motion to
dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, and the motions were
granted. The defense motions were not supported by affidavit but
testimony was taken and interrogatories were offered to buttress
the motions. In reversing the trial court for dismissing the com-
plaint and issuing a summary judgment, the Supreme Court found
that there were genuine issues of fact and repeated the oft-quoted
law on summary judgments:
Granting summary judgment on the record before us
was error. A summary judgment may be granted only
where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Rule 56, R.C.P. Colo. We have many times held, and again
reiterate that a summary judgment is a drastic remedy,
never warranted except in the complete absence of any
40 Id. at 501.
41 1.4 at 51)2.
42 353 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1960).
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genuine issue of material fact. All doubts with respect
thereto must be resolved against the mover [citations] ....
' * * It requires no strained mental exercise to reach
the conclusion that each of plaintiff's alleged claims, if
proved, states a' claim upon which relief may be granted,
and that none is vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
43
In Avery v. City of Fort Collins44 the court again reversed a
summary judgment that came before the court with a claim that
res judicata barred the prosecution of the action before the trial
court. The plaintiff had commenced a class action for a declaratory
judgment, and that action was dismissed on the defendant's motion,
and the judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court when the plain-
tiff elected to stand on the complaint filed.
The second action, Avery v. City of Fort Collins,45 was a tax-
payer's action seeking a different remedy than that sought in the
first case and caused the court to lay down the following law:
In this jurisdiction the dismissal of a case without pre-
judice does not bar a subsequent suit by the same parties
on the same cause of action .... Here the actions were not
identical, the plaintiffs appear in a different capacity and
additional parties are involved.
Defendants argue that a writ of error to this court
from the original judgment resulting in affirmance, alters
the rule. The plaintiffs having 'elected to stand on their
complaint' rather than amend it initially, cannot maintain
a second suit. We are persuaded, however, that the rule
posed by defendants applies only when the original judg-
ment is entered on the merits. . . . Where a defective or
improper complaint has been dismissed without prejudice
and review sought in the Supreme Court resulting in an
affirmance, a new action may thereafter be commenced .... 46
In accord was Hizel v. Howard47 where the court said: ...
For the plea [of res judicata] to be a complete defense,
there must be 'identity of subject matter, identity of cause
of action, identity of persons to the action and identity of
capacity in the persons for which or against whom the
claim is made.' Judgment on the merits precludes not only
matters determined and actually litigated but also all mat-
ters pertaining to the issues which could or might have
been litigated therein. .... 48
The court did not hesitate to approve the granting of a sum-
mary judgment in Vessells v. Davidson Chevrolet"0 where a new
action was commenced to relitigate and collaterally attack former
judgments.
In King Collection Bureau v. Burns5" a summary judgment was
also upheld. The facts behind the court's decision were that the
note which was the subject of the suit contained a provision allow-
ing payment in cash or by the surrender of securities which had
43 Id. at 1100.
44 131 Colo. 34, 278 P.2d 1017 (1955).
45 351 P.2d 286 (Colo. 1960).
46 Id. at 287-88.
47 354 P.2d 611, 612 (Colo. 1960).
48 See Benson v. Bottger, 354 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1960).
49 355 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1960).
50 354 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1960).
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been purchased and paid for in part by the execution of a note and
the entire transaction was set out in the pleadings. The plaintiff
attempted to urge a parol agreement, but the Supreme Court, in
sustaining the summary judgment, found that there was no issue
of fact to be determined and that any ambiguities had been disposed
of through the pleadings.
In a bailment action, Lutz v. Miller,5 ' a motion for summary
judgment was interposed after an answer was filed. The answer
contained a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted and the trial court sustained the mo-
tion for summary judgment. In analyzing the complaint and the
issues, the Supreme Court held that the complaint was sufficient
and that there were issues of fact yet to be determined and remand-
ed the case for further proceedings.
RULE 59
The procedure necessary to protect a successful jury verdict
that fails to withstand a motion for a new trial was clarified by the
court in Chartier v. Winslow Crane Serv. Co.52 and Mobley v. Cart-
wright.5
In Chartier v Winslow Crane Serv. Co.54 the plaintiff won a
verdict of $50,531 from the jury and then saw his verdict fail when
the trial judge granted the defendant's motion for a new trial. The
plaintiff elected to stand on the record as made and the trial court
dismissed the action. The Supreme Court in reviewing the record
said that in Colorado the plaintiff may elect to stand on the order
granting the new trial and obtain a dismissal of the action and re-
view of the trial court's order in the Supreme Court. In reinstating
the verdict of the jury and reviewing the record the court said, in
laying down the so-called non-suit rule, that the test on review is
whether there is substantial [though conflicting] evidence in the
record to support the jury verdict. This evidence must be consid-
ered in the light most favorable to plaintiff and the presumptions
favor the verdict rather than the final judgment of dismissal. The
reason for adoption of this test is that the judgment of dismissal is
actually a court determination that the evidence was not substan-
tial and that a motion for dismissal or a non-suit should have been
granted at the end of the plaintiff's evidence.
In a damage action, Mobley v. Cartwright,5  the plaintiff ob-
tained a'jury verdict which did not withstand the defendant's mo-
tion for a new trial. On retrial the defendant was successful and
the plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict in the second trial and
to reinstate the verdict returned by the jury in the first trial on the
allegation that the trial court erred in granting a new trial. The
plaintiff also filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict and a motion for new trial, but both motions were denied. The
Supreme Court found that there was only one final judgment, the
judgment which followed the second trial, and said that the plain-
tiff, if aggrieved by the granting of the motion for new trial, should
have preserved his right to review upon that issue by standing
51 356 P.2d 242 (Colo. 1960).
52 350 P.2d 1044 (Colo. 1960).
53 348 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1960).
54 350 P.2d 1044 (Colo. 1960).
55 348 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1960).
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upon the record as made and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court. When the plaintiff went to trial, he had waived any error
that the court might have committed in the first trial.
RULE 65
A tax-exempt status was in issue in City and County of Denver
v. Spears Free Clinic and Hosp. for Poor Children.6 Spears claimed
exemption from taxation as a charitable institution under Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 137-12-3 (8) and article X, section 5 of the Colorado
Constitution and sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive re-
lief in the trial court. The trial court granted the relief, and on
writ of error the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and held
that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the issue and that
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the trial
court's ruling.
In Crosby v. Watson57 the Supreme Court reviewed the trial
court's denial of an application for a preliminary prohibitory in-
junction. The plaintiffs claimed for their title an easement for in-
gress and egress over the defendant's land and relied solely upon
adverse possession. The trial judge took evidence and viewed the
premises. In affirming the decision of the trial judge, the court said:
Our former decisions, to which we adhere, hold that
the granting or denial of a preliminary injunction is a mat-
ter in the sound discretion of the trial court and that its de-
termination with reference thereto will not be disturbed
except in case of abuse of discretion .... It is equally well
settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, if based
upon substantial competent evidence, are binding upon this
court, and that we will not substitute our conclusions from
the facts for those of a trial court. This is so even though
there be credible evidence warranting findings different
from those of the trial court....
• Plaintiffs insist that a preliminary injunction should
have been ordered to preserve the status quo of the parties
until a determination of their rights can be made upon final
56 450 P.2d 1057 (Colo. 1960).
57 355 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1960).
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hearing. Had a clear right to a temporary injunction been
sh6wn, plaintiffs' contention would be correct. Injunctive
relief should not be loosely granted. Plaintiffs, as well as
the defendants, will have an opportunity to present their
case in full at a trial on the merits.
Concluding as we do that the matter was one resting
in the sound discretion of the trial court, the order denying
the motion for a preliminary injunction is affirmed.5 8
Of like effect is Allen v. City and County of Denver, 9 where
the Supreme Court sustained the trial court's refusal of a temporary
injunction. The accumulation of water in southwest Denver pre-
cipitated the suit, and an extensive hearing on the injunction issue
followed. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the
denial of an injunction and affirmed the judgment as being within
the sound discretion of the court.
RULE 83
To obtain uniformity and to prevent conflicts in the rules of the
various courts the Supreme Court amended Rule 83 on December
8, 1960, to read as follows:
Each trial court by action of a majority of its judges
may from time to time make and amend rules governing
its practice not inconsistent with these rules nor inconsist-
ent with any directive of the Supreme Court. Local rules
adopted hereunder shall not restrict the authority of the
presiding judge of said court to adopt and enforce admin-
istrative rules, not inconsistent with any directive of the
Supreme Court, relating to assignment of cases, dockets,
and procedures for effecting a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of causes pending before such court. Copies
of proposed rules or amendments to be made by any court,
before their adoption, shall be furnished to the Supreme
Court for its approval. In all cases not provided for herein,
trial courts may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules.
RULE 98
A motion for change of venue was held to be a matter of right
in Cliff v. Gleason.60 The principal case involved construction of a
listing agreement that was to be performed in Jefferson County
where the defendant was served and resided. The trial court denied
the motion for a change of venue and found for the plaintiff. The
court said: "When, as here, an application sufficient in form, un-
contradicted, and supported by allegations in the plaintiff's com-
plaint itself, is made for a change of place of trial, the Court has




Burt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Barth62 appeared for the second time
before the court. In Barth v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc.,63 the court had
59 Id. at 959-60.
59 351 P.2d 390 (Colo. 1960).
60 351 P.2d 394 (Colo. 1960).
61 Id. at 396-97.
62 355 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1960),
63 140 Colo. 128, 342 P.2d 637 (1959).
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reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. Barth filed a mo-
tion to dissolve lhe Writ of attachment after the case was remand-
ed and the motion was granted. On writ of error it was urged that
the motion which was sustained in the trial court had been previ-
ously urged in the trial court and could have been questioned in
the first proceeding before the Supreme Court, and in answer to
the contention the court said:
* . * Rule 102 (aa) R.C.P. Colo. provides in pertinent
part that: '* * * Any order by which an attachment or
garnishment is released or sustained is a final judgment.'
The original judgment entered by the trial court which
sustained the attachment was a final judgment. No writ
of error issued to review it. The parties to the action were
then, and now are, bound by that judgment.
• * ' The final judgment upholding the writ of attach-
ment, not having been questioned in the proceedings on





The restrictions on the use of original proceedings was made
clear by the court in two decisions:
In Bristol v. The County Court, 5 the court had to determine
whether the defendant in the district court had made a record
which entitled him to a writ of prohibition. The defendant was
sued on a promissory note in the county court and gave notice that
he would take the deposition of non-resident officers of the plaintiff
corporation. The parties named in the notice never appeared for
depositions so the defendant moved to require attendance or in the
alternative a dismissal of the complaint. The county court denied
the motion and set the case for trial. The defendant thereupon
commenced a proceeding in the district court seeking prohibition
against further proceedings in the county court and alleging that
the court had abused its discretion in refusing to require the plain-
tiff corporation's officers to appear for a deposition or forego the
prosecution of its complaint. The district court issued a citation to
show cause. At the hearing in the district court the county court
defended its ruling on the basis of the defendant's lack of showing
of adequate cause or the necessity for putting the plaintiff to the
expense of bringing its officers into Colorado for the deposition
when other means of discovery were available. The district court
held that the county court had not abused its discretion and that
the actions of the defendant were designed to obtain review of the
county court's ruling rather than to show an abuse of discretion.
On writ of error to the Supreme Court to review the judgment of
the district court, it was held that a sufficient showing was not
made to justify the use of prohibition, and that the district court
properly discharged the rule under Rule 106 (a) (4).
The rule to show cause was again discharged in Retallack v,
Police Court"6 when an original proceeding in the nature of prohibi-
tion was filed in the Supreme Court challenging the jurisdiction of
64 355 P.2d 538, 539-40 (1960).
65 352 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1960).
66 351 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1960).
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a municipal court in Colorado Springs to try the petitioner on a
charge of reckless and careless driving. The basis of the petitioner's
claim was the now famous Merris case.67 The Supreme Court said:
It is to be noted that although the Merris case ... did
establish the offense of drunken driving to be a statewide
concern and governed by state statute, the most significant
contribution to law in this state which arose out of that
case was a guaranty to all citizens that trials for municipal
violations in municipal courts would be in accordance with
criminal process. That being the case, no person charged
under a municipal ordinance can be prejudiced by leaving
as much of local law intact as can be done without violat-
ing individual rights or undermining state sovereignty.
6 8
In Hollander v. Jacobucci,9 an original proceeding in the na-
ture of mandamus or prohibition, the court made a rule to show
cause permanent. In the principal case, the parents of a minor filed
a complaint in the county court charging their minor daughter with
delinquency. Over the protest of the minor's parents, an attorney
sought leave to appear and defend the minor in the county court.
The county judge prohibited the attorney from appearing, and the
Supreme-Court in its ruling held that all persons are entitled to
counsel of their own choosing and that the selection of counsel can-
not be dictated by those who instigated the action.
In Van Gundy v. O'Kane7° the complainant sought a writ in the
nature of prohibition to prevent further proceedings in the County
Court of Jefferson County on traffic charges which previously
formed the basis of a complaint before a justice of the peace court
in Jefferson County. The district attorney nolle prosequied in the
justice court, with the approval of the court, so that he might pro-
secute the traffic violations in the county court. Van Gundy filed a
motion to dismiss in the county court on the ground that the entry
of the nolle prosequi in the justice court for the purpose of refiling
the action in a court of concurrent jurisdiction did not relieve the
justice court of jurisdiction and enable the county court to proceed.
The admitted reason for the district attorney's action was that Van
Gundy had the audacity to ask for a jury trial in the justice of the
peace court. In condemning the practice, the court elected to treat
the complainant's motion to dismiss as a plea in abatement in the
county court and sent the matter back for further proceedings in
the justice court.
B. Quo Warranto
In People ex rel Mijares v. Kniss7 1 the court considered the his-
tory behind the use of quo warranto and determined that the reme-
dy was not available to oust officers of an unincorporated labor
union on the ground that their election was effected by devious and
unfair means. The district attorney refused to prosecute, and a suit
under Rule 106 (a) (3) followed.
In sustaining the trial court's judgment in favor of the defend-
ants the court said:
67 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
68 351 P.2d 884, 886 (Colo. 1960).
69 349 P.2d 567 (Colo. 1960).
70 351 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1960).
71 357 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1960).
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[Rule 106 (a) (3)] . . . furnishes a substitute for the
common law prerogative writ of quo warranto and the
former statutory remedy in the nature of quo warranto.
Notwithstanding the former remedies have been supplanted
by Rule 106 (a) (3), it must be remembered that '[e]ven
under the Rules of Civil Procedure the substantive aspects
of remedial writs are preserved, and relief of the same na-
ture as was formerly provided in such proceedings may be
granted in accordance with precedents established under
the old practice.' (Emphasis supplied.) [citations] ....
While the procedural pattern has been simplified, the
substance of what constitutes the basis of quo warranto re-
lief remains the same. In order to prevail, proof of the
substantive elements authorizing such relief should be of
the same kind, quality and quantity as would have war-
ranted a favorable judgment under the older forms. [cita-
tions]. . . . 'The various procedural changes * * * do not
affect the basic purposes for which the writ was orginally
designed' [citations] ....
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may not be utilized by members of a labor union to dis-
lodge other members from offices which they hold in the
organization. We believe, first, that the context of the rule
limits its application to public offices, and second, that a
construction of the rule extending its application to test
the title or right to a private office would invalidate it be-
cause such interpretation would result in an encroachment




In Colorado ex rel Gentles v. Barnholt73 the court found that
quo warranto was the proper procedure to test the validity of the
election of corporate officers and directors by reason of the fact
that a corporation is a creature of statute. Suit was filed by a group
of stockholders of Western Oil Fields, Inc., after the district attorney
refused to institute an action. The complaint alleged that certain
stock was issued to a non-resident after a contested corporate elec-
tion was held and that the stock was then voted retroactively to
obtain victory for the incumbent slate of directors. A motion to dis-
miss for failure to join the late voting, non-resident stockholder
was sustained in the trial court and reversed on writ of error. The
defendants contended that the non-resident stockholder was an in-
dispensable party and that the plaintiffs had also failed to join the
corporation in the suit, which also came within the category of an
indispensable party. The Supreme Court agreed that the corpora-
tion was a necessary party, but held that the non-resident stock-
holder was not a necessary party. In the court's opinion, it was
clear that if personal service of process was required upon the non-
resident stockholder, then the shareholders' right of action would
be destroyed or would have to be held in abeyance until the non-
resident happened to venture into Colorado where he could be
served. Such a result, the court felt, would deprive the plaintiffs
of a remedy. The case was remanded to the trial court with direc-
tions to vacate the judgment of dismissal and to grant leave to the
plaintiffs to bring in the corporation as a party defendant and then
determine the matter on the merits.
In People v. Colorado Hiqh School Activities Ass'n,7 4 a com-
plaint was filed as a class action on behalf of a group of citizens,
residents, taxpayers, and voters under the provisions of Rule 106
(a) (3) questioning the legal existence, constitutionality, and validi-
ty of the operations and expenditures of the Colorado High School
Activities Association. The complaint was captioned quo warranto,
injunctive, and other relief. The respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The motion was granted, but no formal judgment of dis-
missal entered. On writ of error, the court pointed out that the re-
lief sought was properly obtainable by way of an action for a
declaratory judgment or an action in the nature of quo warranto
and found that the complaint was sufficient to test the franchise in
issue. The complaint before the court asked relief against parties
who were not named as defendants and were not served with pro-
cess, and, therefore, who were indispensable parties not before the
court. The case was remanded by the Supreme Court to the trial
72 Id. at 353-54.
73 358 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1960).
74 349 P.2d 381 (Colo. 1960).
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court with directions to allow additional parties to be added and
for proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.
An original proceeding in quo warranto, Warren v. People,75
sought to question the right of a county commissioner to hold office,
but the issues were found to be moot after the commissioner, whose
right to office was questioned, resigned. The court directed that
the trial court determine issues which appeared in the original
complaint but which were not before the court.
C. Non-Resident Motorist
Service of process under the Colorado Non-Resident Service
LaW7 6 was questioned in three cases. Original proceedings were
filed in the Supreme Court under Rule 106 alleging lack of jurisdic-
tion in Morrison v. Dist. Court77 and United States Fid. & Gar. Co.
v. District Court.78 In Morrison v Dist. Court79 the complainant
sought to prohibit the trial court from requiring further pleading
in an action pending in the District Court wherein he appeared as
defendant. An automobile accident gave rise to a complaint based
upon the family purpose doctrine, and service was made under the
Colorado Non-Resident Motorist Act.80 The complainant filed a
motion to quash the service which was supported by an affidavit
alleging non-residence, absence from the state at the time of the
accident, and the fact that the automobile was not a family car. The
complainant also denied the authority of the secretary of state to
accept service as his agent and contended that his son, who was the
driver of the car, was not his agent, servant, or employee, and that
he held the title to the car as a security device only. In reaffirming
its earlier pronouncement in Carlson v. Dist. Court8 the court held
that the affidavit and motion filed by the complainant was couched
with conclusions of law and was an attempt to equivocate. It said
that where the conclusions of law set forth by the complainant were
contradicted by facts appearing in the affidavits, the trial court was
correct in adopting the facts rather than the conclusions. The court,
in upholding the jurisdiction of the trial court, said that if it ap-
peared in the trial court that the automobile involved in the acci-
dent was not within the family purpose doctrine, the complainant
could not be held liable.
In General Ins. Co. of Am. v. O'Day 8 2 judgment was obtained
by default after service was effected upon the secretary of state and
a summons, complaint, and notice of service upon the secretary of
state was sent to the defendant by registered mail and was returned
marked "unclaimed." After default judgment was entered by the
trial court, the plaintiff looked to the insurance carrier for payment
of the judgment. The Supreme Court found that the judgment was
void and that each step set forth in the non-resident service of pro-
cess statute was jurisidictional and had to be strictly complied with.
The defendant had not received or refused to accent the registered
mail, and, therefore, service was never completed. The judgment
was reversed.
75 354 P.2d 1021 (Colo. 1960).
76 Colo. Rev. Stat. 9§ 13-8-1 to 13-8-.4 (1953).
77 355 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1960).
78 353 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1960).
79 355 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1960).
80 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-8-1 (1953).
81 116 Colo. 330, 180 P.2d 525 (1957).
82 356 P.2d 888 (Colo. 1960).
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Original proceedings were also looked to in United States Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Dist. Court 3 to bar further action in the trial court.
The complainant was garnisheed as the insurance carrier of a serv-
ice man from Connecticut who was involved in an accident in Colo-
rado while stationed on a military base in Colorado. Judgment was
obtained by default in the trial court after service was effected un-
der the non-resident motorist statute. In an answer to the garnish-
ment, the complainant alleged that the court was proceeding with-
out jurisdiction. In holding that a service man is a non-resident for
the purpose of service, the court set out the purpose of the statute
and discharged the rule, thereby upholding the service:
The typical case which the statute is apparently de-
signed to meet is where the defendant is only transiently
operating a motor vehicle on the Colorado highways, al-
though by its terms it is not limited to one making a con-
tinuous journey through the State, but covers any case
where a non-resident, operating a motor vehicle in this
State, causes damage.
Upon the evidence submitted to the trial court it found
that Shea was a non-resident of Colorado at the time of the
accident, and there is ample competent evidence to sustain
this finding. We cannot interfere with a finding so sup-
ported S4
RULE 111
The Supreme Court refused to countenance the instructions
given on damages in Kendall v. Hargrave.5 Neither party objected
to any of the instructions given by the court, but the court, looking
to the provisions of Rule 111 (f), found error appearing on the face
of the record and in the interest of justice reversed the rulin- of
the trial court.
RULE 120
The court held in Hastings v. Security Thrift & Mortgage Co. 8 6
that Rule 98 had no application to a proceeding under Rule 120, and
that a sale accomplished under Rule 120 on a note secured by a deed
of trust did not constitute an adversary proceeding subject to review
by writ of error. In dismissing the writ of error, the court declared
that there was no requirement under Rule 120 that a suit be insti-
tuted in the county where the property described was located when
sale was sought under the powers of the deed of trust.
83 353 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1960).
X4 Id. at 1094.
85 359 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1960).
S6 357 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1960).
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